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Available online 15 May 2017Public perception, fueled not only by popular and newsmedia but also by expert claims that psychopaths are ar-
chetypes of evil: incorrigible, remorseless, cold-blooded criminals, whose crimes manifest in the most extreme
levels of violence. But is there empirical evidence that psychopaths truly are what they are portrayed to be? If
so, should the law respond, and adjust its treatment of psychopaths in court— permitting psychopathy to be ad-
mitted under an insanity defense and/or resulting inmitigation? In this paper, we demonstrate that fundamental
questions from the law to science remain unanswered andmust be addressed before any alternative treatment of
psychopathy can be considered. As it stands, psychopaths cannot be reliably defined or diagnosed and, aswewill
demonstrate, even the presumed link with criminal dangerousness is problematic. We conclude that the current
legal approach should not be modified, however, if preliminary findings regarding impairments in impulsivity/
self-control are confirmed, some, but not all individuals who fall under one definition of psychopathy may
merit different treatment in future.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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The public has increasingly been given the message that ‘psycho-
paths are threatening, expensive and untreatable’. For example, inCEE, Universidad de Córdoba,
a).
. This is an open access article under2006, Babiak and Hare wrote (p. 17–18): “We now know that both
male and female psychopaths commit a greater number and variety of
crimes than do other criminals. Their crimes tend to be more violent…
and their general behavior more controlling, aggressive, threatening,
and abusive. Further, their aggression and violence tend to be predatory
in nature - cold-blooded… instrumental… and seldom followed by
anything even approaching normal concern for the pain and suffering
inflicted on others… Psychopathic criminals recidivate at amuch higherthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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tion. They are responsible for at least half of the persistent serious and
violent crimes committed in North America. Yet… not all psychopaths
turn to a life of crime, and not all criminals are psychopaths. Psycho-
paths can be just ‘snakes in suits’.”
These alarming claims, presented to the public by key experts in the
field as facts, are representative of the unsettling picture of psychopathy
currently developing in society. Fueled by increasing negativemedia at-
tention, these messages, along with mounting evidence for supposed
neurobiologicalmarkers of psychopathy,may influence, ormay have al-
ready begun to influence, decisions made by policy makers and courts.
The question is: Is the concept of psychopathy clear enough and is
there currently sufficient empirical evidence to support these assump-
tions and to justify this influence?
In contrast to its treatment of individuals with diagnosable mental
health problems, based on official classification systems, criminal law
does not currently excuse or mitigate ‘psychopaths’. To date, the tradi-
tional view that psychopathy is not a mental disorder but a ‘way of
being’, a specific type of personality, persists in the majority of courts.
Thus, in the eyes of the law, psychopaths are ‘bad’ not ‘mad’. Psychopa-
thy is treated either as irrelevant, or as an aggravating factor due to the
very high level of criminal dangerousness traditionally associated with
it (see e.g., Rice & Harris, 2013).
In recent years, voices questioning the current legal treatment of psy-
chopathy have appeared in the literature (e.g., Gillett & Huang, 2013;
Godman & Jefferson, 2014; Nadelhoffer & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012).
They criticize the current legal systemon the grounds that advances in be-
havioral neuroscience and genetics have not been incorporated; they ad-
vocate a different approach to criminal responsibility for psychopaths
based on biosocial impairments. Thiswouldmost likely result inmore se-
vere legal treatment through ‘selective incapacitation’ and potential life-
long commitment (Morse, 2008b) commensuratewith their greater dan-
gerousness (Coid &Maden, 2003; Luna, 2013), their difficulty engaging in
and responding to traditional psychotherapeutic or psychopharmacolog-
ical approaches, and the subsequent lack of successful treatment out-
comes (Polaschek, 2014; Salekin, Worley, & Grimes, 2010).
Psychopathy is a challenge for our socio-liberal, free-will and
culpability-based Criminal Law systems, because it represents archetypes
of ‘evil’, of incorrigible criminals, for whom a retributive culpability-based
punishment is not enough and a consequentialist ‘dangerousness-based’
legal response would be required. Whether under the name of ‘psychop-
athy’ or another name, this is an old and well-known problem for Crimi-
nal Law (at least since Lombroso, 1896; Ferri, 1881(1929); Garófalo,
1885(2005); or von Liszt, 1883). However, the scientific context is new,
and forces us to look at what the Law can learn from it. If neuroscience
and genetics have new information to offer, the Law should not be indif-
ferent, but open to considering pertinent developments and adapting
where necessary. In this paper we address this issue and, in so doing,
we also hope to contribute to elucidating any discrepancies between the
current ‘status quo’ (in terms of advances in research) and the informa-
tion distributed to the public.
As we will demonstrate, key questions from the law to science re-
garding psychopathy remain unanswered, arising in particular from
fundamental disagreements and contradictions in the basic definition
of the concept itself, which map onto two different profiles. In fact, de-
pending on whom one asks, psychopathy is (or is not) synonymous
with sociopathy and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD; Walsh &
Bolen, 2012). Moreover, parallel gaps and contradictions can be found
in the literature examining the biological markers of psychopathy. For
legal thinkers, this scenario leads to a genuine perplexity, where even
the dangerousness component of psychopathy needs to be clarified,
particularly because of the recognition of ‘successful psychopaths’
(who do not tend to be criminally dangerous) as a category.
We will conclude, that the current legal treatment, at least for ‘pri-
mary psychopaths’, should not be modified; the accepted presence of
‘successful’ psychopaths rules out any relevant mental alteration andprecludes a direct correlation with criminal behavior. We will also con-
clude that ‘secondary psychopaths’ might receive, in individual cases,
different legal treatment in the future, if the preliminary findings
pointing to impairments in self-control/impulsivity are confirmed.
Finally, it is important to highlight that this is a legal paper. Its aim is
to review the key scientific findings available to date, as well as identify
the outstanding questions from law to science to consider its findings
and to potentially inform normative solutions. It is not the goal of this
paper to provide an exhaustive review of the literature, make any new
proposals or theorize about the psychological concept of psychopathy
nor the proposed biological markers attributed to it by the literature.
Our purpose is, then, to assess whether the current legal treatment of
psychopathy is adequate or not; whether it takes into consideration
the findings of the contemporary scientific literature; and whether
any changes are warranted.2. The concept of psychopathy
Before we discuss the legal requirements or criteria that ‘psychopa-
thy’ would have to meet in order to be considered in sentencing, it is
necessary to establish what the concept of psychopathy actually is.
The definition of psychopathy poses the first important difficulty. Psy-
chopathy is far from being a clear and generally shared concept, and
there is a lack of consensus regarding its distinctive features, or the un-
derlying psychological or neurobiological profiles. However, a clear def-
inition is essential for the Law, in order to properly apply the legal
requirements with respect to psychopathy or any other psychological
disorder or condition.
The most commonly used definition of a psychopath has been: a self-
centered, callous, remorseless individual, lacking empathy and the ability
to form close relationships; and a person who acts without the restric-
tions of a conscience, linked to a limited capacity to experience emotions,
such as fear and anxiety. Their only goal is the satisfaction of their own
needs, often through engagement in criminal behavior (Hare, 1991). Psy-
chopaths are also described as having intact cognitive capacity, being able
to distinguish between right and wrong, but lacking emotional empathy
and having diminished inhibitory control (Blair, 2005).
There is general consensus that the key personality traits of psycho-
paths are lack of emotional empathy and lack of a sense of responsibil-
ity, often referred to as Callous and Unemotional traits (CU). There is
also some agreement that antisocial behavior (not necessarily criminal)
is, at least, a behavioral outcome or recurrentmanifestation of psychop-
athy (see Skeem, Polaschek, Patrick & Lilienfeld, 2011, for a review).
These traits also manifest through severe deficits in the ability to recog-
nize and experience social emotions; that is, positive or negative
emotions felt in relation to others, including shame, embarrassment,
guilt, empathy, and love, in addition to fear and sadness (e.g. Dawel,
O'Kearney, McKone, & Palermo, 2012). Experience of emotions seems
to focus and modify brain activity, leading us to choose cooperative,
long-term reward responses over cheating/manipulation and immedi-
ate rewards. It is this aspect which makes them crucial for regulating
and maintaining the balance between self-interest and group interest
(seeWalsh & Bolen, 2012:156). Aswewill discuss later, this perspective
of psychopathy is relevant for a consequentialist criminal law, because
social emotions, and the ability to experience them, are essential in pre-
ventive strategies incorporated into the criminal justice system. These
rely primarily on the internalization of moral norms, through socializa-
tion and motivation, as well as deterrence through the use of punish-
ment, as a threat to deter people from engaging in criminal activity
(von Hirsch, Bottoms, Burney, & Wikström, 1999, for all). According to
Lykken (2000) and others (e.g., Mealey, 1995), lack of socialization in
‘primary psychopaths’ would arise from their inherent impairments,
whereas in ‘secondary psychopaths’ (for Lykken — ‘sociopaths’), from
a maladaptive early socialization environment, inconsistent parenting
and family violence in particular.
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mental disagreements and contradictions need to be considered (see
Skeem et al., 2011 for a general review). Two quite contradictory pro-
files for psychopathy have been described and further conceptual per-
plexity arises from the variety of terms employed to describe these
profiles.
2.1. Cold-blooded-unemotional vs. anxious-emotionally reactive individuals
With the exception of historic records, which are now believed to
have been referring to similar concepts (Pinel, 1806 “manie sans delire”,
for example; or Lombroso, 1896, “delinquente nato”… see Sass &
Felhaus, 2014), the first conceptualization of psychopathy was formu-
lated by Hervey Cleckley, in his seminal work “The mask of sanity”,
originally published in 1941 (5th ed. 1976). Here, Cleckley described
psychopaths as outwardly normally functioning individuals of average
to high intelligence, who fail to learn from their personal experiences
or to plan ahead. He further described them as individuals who do not
seem to experience anxiety, delusions or neuroses, they lack any signif-
icant concern about themselves or the impact of their behavior on
others, and show little, or superficial consideration for the feelings of
others, being consummate liars and having superficial charm. Note
that antisocial behavior, including criminal behavior, now commonly
associated with psychopathy, is absent from Cleckley's description and
only originates much later from the conceptualizations of McCord and
McCord (1964) and Robins (1966). The fact that these studies were
based on offender samples may be a potential source of the discrepancy
where anti-social and criminal behaviors are concerned. The psycho-
pathic individuals observed by these authors had some emotional defi-
cits in common with Cleckley's patients. However, they were also
described as hostile, callous, impulsive and aggressive, and exhibited
chronic antisocial behavior. Capturing these characteristics under a sin-
gle clinical diagnosis led to the inclusion of ASPD in the DSM-III
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Skeem et al., 2011).
Since Cleckley's introduction of the term, several definitions, con-
ceptualizations and categorizations of psychopathy have been pro-
posed. Perhaps the most widely known to date is Robert Hare's (1991,
2003) work. Through his Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1980) and
Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991, 2003), Hare initially
conceptualized psychopathy using a two factor model; his two factors
continue to be used to refer to the key aspects of psychopathy and to de-
lineate different types of psychopaths (described below).
Factor 1 — The Interpersonal/Affective domain includes callous and
unemotional traits such as: glibness/superficial charm; grandiose
sense of self-worth; cunningness/manipulativeness; lack of remorse
or guilt; emotional shallowness; lack of empathy; and failure to ac-
cept responsibility for actions.
Factor 2— The Antisocial domain consists mostly of behavioral traits
associated with an antisocial lifestyle: a need for stimulation/prone-
ness to boredom; parasitic lifestyle; poor behavioral control; pro-
miscuous sexual behavior; lack of realistic long-term goals;
impulsiveness; irresponsibility; juvenile delinquency; early behav-
ioral problems; and revocation of conditional release.
Based on this initial characterization, taking into account the key
traits of Factor 2, psychopathy would be a clinical condition defined by
a combination of persistent antisocial behavior, marked sensation-
seeking, impulsivity and punishment insensitivity that emerges early
in life (Hare, 2003; Yang et al., 2015). Thus, PCL-R derived psychopathy,
perhaps because it was developed based on criminal samples, is more
consistent with the definitions put forward by McCord and McCord
(1964) (as mentioned in Skeem et al., 2011:101), than with Cleckley's
original conceptualization.Conversely, others (for example Cooke, Michie, Hart, & Clark, 2004)
have posited that it is the underlying personality features which charac-
terize Factor 1 (such as interpersonal grandiosity and deficiencies in affec-
tive experiences and empathy) which are key to the conceptualization of
psychopathy and that behavioral problems, consistent with Factor 2, are
better understood as consequences of these traits. Given failed attempts
to replicate the original two-factor model, Cooke and Michie (2001) pro-
posed a three-factor model of PCL-R psychopathy and subsequently,
aiming to better capture a psychopathic personality, Hare (2016) intro-
duced a four-factor model. In the three factor model, the original Factor
1 is sub-divided into Factor 1 (affective deficits) and Factor 2 (interper-
sonal deficits), and behavioral deficits are included in Factor 3. Notably,
in the three-factor model the five items measuring criminal behavior
were discarded. In the four-factor model, those five items were retained
and included in Factor 4 (criminal behavior). The currently favored
four-factor model has been widely utilized and validated (e.g., Weaver,
Meyer, Van Nort, & Tristan, 2006; Zwets, Hornsveld, Neumann, Muris, &
van Marle, 2015). Person centered analyses based on the four-factor
model have also been carried out (e.g., Neumann, Vitacco, & Mokros,
2016) and yielded four different offender profiles described as: 1. a psy-
chopath group — scoring high on all four PCL-R factors; 2. a callous-con-
ning group — scoring high mainly on the Interpersonal and Affective
factors; 3. a sociopathic offender group— scoring highmainly on the Life-
style and Antisocial Factor; and 4. a general offender group— scoring low
on all factors.
Moving away from the PCL-R as a key diagnostic and definitional
tool, Lynam and Widiger (2007) have proposed a conceptualization of
psychopathywithin the framework of the five factormodel of personal-
ity functioning (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1990). The FFM includes the fol-
lowing five dimensional personality characteristics: neuroticism,
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscien-
tiousness. Based on their analyses of the characteristics underlying
these five dimensions, Lynam andWidiger (2007) proposed 12 charac-
teristics as representing the core features of psychopathy. According to
these authors, a ‘prototypical’ psychopathwould score lowonfive facets
of agreeableness (straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty,
and tendermindedness), three facets of conscientiousness (dutifulness,
deliberation, and self-discipline), one facet of neuroticism (self-consci-
entiousness) and one of extraversion (warmth). In addition, such a per-
son would score high on impulsiveness (from the neuroticism factor)
and excitement seeking. Based on these characteristics, a team of re-
searchers also developed a five-factor model rating form (Mullins-
Sweatt, Jamerson, Samuel, Olson, & Widiger, 2006), which has been
used in research on psychopathy (e.g., Beaver, Hartman, & Belsky,
2014;Miller & Lynam, 2015) and subsequently thedimensional concep-
tualization of psychopathy, including the psychopathic personality in-
ventory has been used to develop further scales (PPI; Lilienfeld &
Fowler, 2006). The Triarchic Model of psychopathy (Patrick, Fowles, &
Krueger, 2009) defines psychopaths based on possessing varying de-
grees of three distinct observable (phenotypic) characteristics: boldness
(or fearless dominance), meanness, and disinhibition (Skeem et al.,
2011).
The above conceptualizations/definitions of psychopathy all paint
slightly different pictures of who a psychopath is or is not. Indeed, if
there was consistency multiple definitions would not be necessary.
While there is someoverlap, there are alsomanydifferences and several
contradictions. For instance, while the PCL-R focuses on the antisocial
personality, exhibited primarily through antisocial behavior, the con-
ceptualization based on the FFM model does not include engagement
in this behavior. There also seem to be different types of psychopaths
(see also, Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2012 and below). These
differences are of key importance to the law, for two main reasons:
first, if they are to be considered as definitional features of psychopathy,
including antisocial behavior, it should be possible to connect the type
of offense and behavioral expression (instrumental or impulsive aggres-
sion, for instance) with the specific type of disorder, as this is a
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plain below); and second, it would also be consistent with the common
association between psychopathy and criminal dangerousness.
In addition, based on this conceptualization, it seems clear that indi-
viduals scoring high on the items assessing the antisocial component
(Factor 2) are significantly more diverse than those who score high on
the interpersonal/affective domain (Factor 1). For this reason, some
researchers have questioned whether Factor 2 (primarily violent)
individuals are truly psychopaths or not. For example, Skeem et al.
(2011), queried whether “anxious and emotionally reactive people,
that are identified as psychopaths by the PCL-R” are truly psychopaths
(p. 104).We believe this to be a pertinent question, given the radical dif-
ferences between the underlying temperamental profiles of Factors 1
and 2, and between Cleckley's and McCord and McCord's respective
conceptualizations of psychopathy. Skeem et al. (2011) point out that
the interpersonal–affective factor (Factor 1: subdivided into interper-
sonal and affective facets) linked to ‘primary’ psychopathy (see below
for more about this distinction), is associated with fearlessness, narcis-
sism, low emotional empathy, and social dominance and is inversely as-
sociated with negative emotionality. In contrast, the antisocial factor,
linked to ‘secondary’ psychopathy (Factor 2: also divisible into impul-
sive–irresponsible lifestyle and antisocial behavior facets) is associated
with negative emotionality, impulsivity, frustration, general sensation
seeking, substance abuse and reactive aggression (Skeem et al., 2011;
p. 119). Importantly, impulsivity and reactive aggression (see Blair,
2010b), associatedwith Factor 2, seem to be the core features of second-
ary psychopathy. ‘Primary’ psychopaths, however, are presented as
“emotionally stable” (see Skeem et al., 2011; p. 119; Snowden & Gray,
2011). In addition, when looking at the PCL-R, Factors 1 and 2 are only
moderately positively correlated and, importantly, they show correla-
tions in opposite directions with external variables, such as anxiety.
Moreover, only Factor 2, consistent with ‘secondary’ psychopathy,
would predict future delinquent and antisocial behavior (see Skeem
et al., 2011; Yang, Wong & Coid, 2010) which is consistent with risk-
based explanations of aggression and crime (Farrington, 1985), suggest-
ing that it is past behavior and not psychopathic features (Factor 1 and
consistent CU traits) that best predict future engagement in similar be-
havior. Again, these contradictory profiles underlying the same categori-
cal definition are highly relevant for the Law. As we will explain later,
only deficits in self-control are currently relevant, and only in some
legal systems, for insanity defense or mitigation. Yet based on the litera-
ture available thus far, not all psychopaths show volitional impairments.
Recently, even more approaches to defining psychopathy have
emerged, however, these do not seem to solve the existing problems
but open up new discussion. For example, currently, there is overall
consensus in the literature that psychopathy should be considered as
a dimensional, rather than a categorical construct (e.g., Guay, Ruscio,
Knight, & Hare, 2007; Hare & Neumann, 2005, Hare & Neumann,
2008; Lynam&Derefinko, 2006; Patrick et al., 2009). Psychopathy is un-
derstood as a question of degree and not, at least completely, as categor-
ical/taxonomical. In other words, what matters is the degree of
psychopathic characteristics that an individual exhibits, rather than
whether they are indeed ‘a psychopath’ or not, or whether they could
in fact be classified as something else. Ironically, while the dimensional
view of psychopathy has been gaining in popularity, experts in the field
(e.g., Hare, 2016) have highlighted the existence of a category of severe
or “hardcore” (Guay et al., 2007; p. 1589) psychopaths at the top end of
the continuum. Focusing on this sub-group may enable the reconsider-
ation of the prevalence of ‘psychopathy’ in society and its real impact.
A dimensional view perhaps increases the likelihood of those with
characteristics of psychopathy which are not unique and are therefore
shared with other disorders (such as autism, ADHD, ODD or ASPD)
meeting criteria for psychopathy. This is not only conceptually confus-
ing and clinically counter-productive, it also leaves use of mitigation
or insanity defense based specifically upon psychopathy impossible —
as those who qualify as psychopaths under this definition may in factnot be. However, the dimensional approach could have advantages in
the context of the legal system as it could be used to base legal criteria
upon discrete types of impairment (whichmay be common to multiple
disorders) rather than on specific disorders. As such, it could be more
likely to open the door for an insanity defense or to mitigation for
unspecified disorders than a categorical interpretation would be. It
also allows for the identification of pathological personalities with im-
pairments relevant to criminal liability. A dimensional view of psychop-
athy has also led to the search formultiple causal factors that contribute
to the development of psychopathic features, instead of a focus on find-
ing the one underlying cause (Murrie et al., 2007). In our opinion, how-
ever, in spite of the posited advantages of the dimensional perspective,
the key question of whether there are actually two distinct versions of
psychopathy remains (see Walters, 2015).
2.2. Primary vs. secondary psychopathy
The distinction between primary (born/fearless-cold-blooded) and
secondary (made/anxious–impulsive) psychopaths is another well-
known distinction made in the psychopathy literature. The two types
of psychopaths have shown correlations with the two main domains
of the PCL, as discussed above, and as such provide further support for
the general acceptance of two profiles of psychopaths in the wider psy-
chopathy literature. Since the early 1940s, psychopaths have been the-
orized to be a heterogeneous group of individuals, who do not all
share common etiological and phenotypic features (Cleckley, 1941;
Karpman, 1941). Karpman (1941) first proposed the distinction
between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ psychopaths. He described
‘primary’psychopaths, also referred to as ‘idiopathic’psychopaths, as in-
dividuals for whom certain traits, such as callousness, interpersonal
unemotionality, and lack of remorse, were innate or inborn. ‘Secondary’
psychopaths were conceptualized as a separate group of individuals,
who, according to Karpman and many others following him (e.g.
Blonigen, Hicks, Krueger, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005; Flexon, 2015a;
Skeem, Johansson, Andershed, Kerr, & Louden, 2007), are not born
with these characteristics, but acquire them in response to adverse
childhood experiences such as maltreatment.
Since Karpman's first formulation of these two variants of psycho-
paths, researchers have endeavored to empirically distinguish between
and describe the two groups. In terms of delineating them, researchers
(e.g. Blais, Solodukhin, & Forth, 2014; Vaughn, DeLisi, Beaver &
Wright, 2009; Skeemet al., 2007) found that compared to ‘primary’ psy-
chopaths, who are characterized by a lack of anxiety, ‘secondary’ psy-
chopaths exhibit greater anxiety. This contrast has been used as an
identifying marker in research to distinguish between the two groups
(Flexon, 2015b) and further distinctions between the two types have
been observed. ‘Secondary’ psychopaths exhibit poor interpersonal
functioning (including irritability, hostility, impulsivity and social with-
drawal) compared to ‘primary’ psychopaths; more symptoms of major
mental disorders (including depression); higher juvenile delinquency
and drug abuse, and greater exposure to traumatic experiences
(Patrick, 2010; Vaughn, DeLisi, et al., 2009; Skeem et al., 2007). In addi-
tion, each may be characterized by different neurobiological abnormal-
ities (Raine, 2013 and see below).
With respect to antisocial behavior overall, while there is some in-
consistency in research findings, evidence thus far suggests that, com-
pared to ‘primary’ psychopaths, ‘secondary’ psychopaths engage in at
least comparable levels (e.g., Skeem et al., 2007) but more often in
higher rates of antisocial behaviors (e.g., Camp, Skeem, Barchard,
Lilienfield, & Poythress, 2013; Vaughn, DeLisi, et al., 2009; Vaughn,
Edens, Howard and Smith, 2009; Lykken, 2000). One recent study
(Flexon, 2015a, 2015b) examined the relation of each type of psychop-
athy with violence in a non-institutionalized sample of 15-year-olds,
revealing significant links in young people whomet criteria for ‘second-
ary’ psychopathy, but not in those who met criteria for ‘primary’
psychopathy. While further research is needed to explain the link
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pothesis points to an underlying link between co-occurring traits, such
as impulsivity and hostility, and antisocial behavior in ‘secondary’
psychopaths.
Nonetheless, the distinction between primary and secondary psy-
chopaths (as two distinct populations) is not generally accepted and,
furthermore, it is not recognized in the DSM-5 or the ICD-10. This
poses an immediate problem for those advocating changes to the legal
treatment of psychopaths. The evidence available thus far (e.g., Hicks,
Markon, Patrick, Krueger, & Newman, 2004; Fowles & Dindo, 2009;
Patrick, 2007; Patrick & Bernat, 2010) suggests that the two factors of
the PCL-R reasonably match the notion of primary and secondary psy-
chopathy (Hicks et al., 2004) (or the distinction between psychopaths
and sociopaths depending upon the terminology used) and that such
a distinction should definitely be implemented, rather than perpetuat-
ing the traditional view that bothpopulations belong to oneoverarching
group and fall into the category of ‘psychopaths’.
More recently, a further differentiation among psychopaths has been
suggested by applying a person centered statistical approach, utilizing
the PCL-R scores of offenderswith extreme scores. From this, researchers
(e.g., Mokros et al., 2015) have isolated three different subtypes of psy-
chopaths: 1. manipulative psychopaths, 2. aggressive psychopaths, and
3. sociopathic offenders. In a recent review, Hare (2016) indicated that
while the characteristics of the sociopathic offender group are consistent
with those of ‘secondary psychopaths’, ASPD, or severe externalizing be-
havior problems;manipulative psychopaths and aggressive psychopaths
represent two sub-groups of ‘primary psychopaths’. Similarly, to further
clarify (or complicate thematter), through identifying inconsistencies in
research exploring ‘primary’ vs. ‘secondary’ psychopaths, Yildirim and
Derksen (2015) proposed further sub-categories for each (three types
of primary psychopaths and two types of secondary psychopaths).
In our opinion, given that secondary psychopaths are described as
having impairments affecting impulsivity (andmay also show neurobi-
ological differences as we will see below), such differentiation might
allow a reconsideration of psychopathy by the law. But before that can
take place, a consensus in the specialized literature is essential.
2.3. Successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths
Finally, the notion of psychopathy is further obscured by yet another
ill-defined distinction,which particularly complicates the assessment of
the current legal treatment of this ‘disorder’. There is an emerging inter-
est in examining ‘successful’ psychopaths in comparison with ‘unsuc-
cessful’ psychopaths. Successful psychopaths have been described as
individuals possessing Factor 1 PCL-R traits, including willingness to
take calculated risk, superficial charm, and fearlessness. They are able
to use these skills successfully in a range of professional careers without
engaging in overt criminal activity or, if doing so, successfully avoiding
being caught (Mullins-Sweatt, Glover, Derefinko, Miller, & Widiger,
2010; Smith,Watts, & Lilienfeld, 2014). Hare referred to themas “snakes
in suits”, who succeed as politicians, business men, professors, physi-
cians and the like (Babiak & Hare, 2006).
In recognizing such definitions, the first question for a lawyer is
whether little or no criminal record, or the ability to avoid detection,
can be a criterion for a meaningful definition. Furthermore, as Glenn
and Raine (2014, p.149) pointed out, the diversity in which successful
psychopaths have been defined and operationalized across different
studies compromises the comparability of the findings. They identified
the following four definitions of successful psychopaths in the litera-
ture: 1. Individuals scoring high on psychopathy, who have never
been convicted of a crime; 2. individuals scoring high on psychopathy,
who are not incarcerated; 3. individuals with psychopathic traits and
high social status; and 4. serial killers who have escaped detection for
a significant period.
From a criminal law perspective, such definitions and criteria de-
rived from them, are simply baffling. In fact, in our view, the categoryof ‘successful’ psychopaths can be considered a ‘trojan horse’ for psy-
chopathy, as it problematizes current understandings of the construct.
Taking these definitions into consideration enables us to derive the fol-
lowing possibilities:
a) that ‘successful’ psychopaths generally engage in criminal behavior in
the same way that ‘unsuccessful’ psychopaths do, but they exhibit a
higher level of executive functioning and intelligence enabling them
to avoid detection. As we will see in the next section, this would be
consistent with evolutionary explanations of psychopathy and with
findings which preclude any neural impairments, rather than the op-
posite, seen in successful psychopaths. But this also challenges the no-
tion of any neurobiological marker of ‘psychopathy’. From a legal
perspective, as we will see below, psychopathy by itself would be, ab
initio, excluded from consideration for any approach to themental in-
sanity defense or mitigation based on diminished responsibility.
b) consistent with scoring high on Factor 1, there is an increased likeli-
hood that ‘successful’ psychopaths would be bold, emotionally stable
individuals and that such traits may confer advantage, rendering
these individuals more competitive in contemporary society, which
is inmanyways also ‘psychopathic’. Those individuals would not nor-
mally engage in criminal behavior, but they would be able to success-
fully profit from social rules bent to their own self-interests. If so, CU-
traits (the essence of psychopathy) would not consistently (or reli-
ably) predict criminal behavior, or criminal dangerousness (Skeem &
Cooke, 2010; Skeem et al., 2011). This would also be consistent with
the initial conceptualizations of psychopathy, and with the literature
suggesting that emotional and interpersonal traits of psychopathy,
by themselves, are not predictive of crime. Moreover, in the absence
of engagement in criminal activity and by utilizing their unique
characteristics for the benefit of society, ‘successful psychopaths’
are socially acceptable and perhaps even celebrated as heroes. Factor
1 psychopathic traits (e.g., emotional coldness and the ability to
quicklymake difficult decisions) could be viewed as important lead-
ership skills and have been observed in, for example, the celebrated
author Ian Fleming as well as his popular spy character James Bond
(Dutton, 2012).
This option, however, starkly contradicts themessages shaping pub-
lic opinion of psychopathy, which is linked to criminal dangerousness,
and to claims that the highest recidivism rates are associated with psy-
chopaths as well as the consensus in the majority of the scientific liter-
ature, which seems to perpetuate the link between psychopathy and
criminal behavior over the less ‘dramatic’ link between psychopathy
and general antisocial behavior. Beaver, Boutwell, Barnes, Vaughn, and
DeLisi (2012), for example, measured psychopathic traits and criminal
system contact within a national sample of males and females, and
they concluded that there was a strong association between psychopa-
thy and criminal outcomes, with no relevant influence from sex, age or
ethnicity. This study is in the minority, as most research has been con-
ducted with criminal samples, which contributes to the perpetuation
of the above association. Moreover, the literature has been recently fo-
cusing on the link between psychopathy and career criminals, and
life-course-persistent (LCP) offenders (see e.g., Corrado, DeLisi, Hart, &
McCuish, 2015; Fox, Jennings, & Farrington, 2015).
In our opinion, the emerging distinction between successful and un-
successful psychopaths seriously obscures the debate about the legal re-
sponsibility of psychopaths. It renders an adequate clarification of the
concept of psychopathy and a net distinction of the two underlying pro-
files, even more urgent.
3. Mental insanity defense and reduced culpability at sentencing —
differences and commonalities between common law and civil law
Our next step is to analyzewhether the designation of the defendant
as a ‘psychopath’ may be considered under any of the defenses
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ample of Civil Law (the European Continental System), and its corre-
spondent insanity defense under the Common Law system (CLS;
considering the US and England legal situation). In addition, we will ex-
plore its potential relevance in consideringmitigating circumstances set
forth in article 21 of the SPC and corresponding legislature in the CLS.
We will conclude that given the advances in the scientific literature
thus far, psychopathy does notmeet the legal standards for exoneration
or for mitigation; nor does it warrant a revision of the law. Putting aside
the substantive or procedural differences between normative systems
or national requirements, the Spanish regulations can be taken as an il-
lustrative example of the dimensional nature of criminal accountability
and the requirements to reliably document in court the extent of im-
pairments in the cognitive or volitional capacity of the defendant, in
order to establish the appropriate legal response. Taking the Spanish
regulations as a reference,wewill discuss the legal options for ‘psychop-
athy’ and, given the similarities across legal systems, we contend that
our conclusionswill bewidely applicable. In fact, criminal responsibility
is grounded in folk psychology (Morse, 2008a), which explains the ab-
sence of key conceptual contradictions and the common substance of
legal systems, at least, in countries within our cultural orbit. In fact,
the Spanish regulations are representative of other continental
European legal systems, as it is essentially equivalent to paragraph §20
of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch-StGB), §11 of the
Austrian Penal Code (StGB-Österreich), and the provisions in the French
Penal Code, Art 122-1, among others. As we will show below, national
regulations under Common Law generally have a narrower definition
of the insanity defense, butwe all have a common notion of criminal ac-
countability. Beyond the differences in the extent of applicability of the
defense in each system or country, we share a common grounding, a
common language, and also similar options in theory, as full or partial
insanity defense, diminished responsibility or mitigation. Therefore,
we can discuss the legal treatment for psychopathy with shared argu-
ments and offer broadly-applicable solutions and conclusions.
Under the SPC, Article 20, §1 addresses the issue of the insanity de-
fense, and indirectly also defines the capacity for criminal responsibility,
as follows: “The following persons shall not be criminally accountable:
1. Those who, at the time of committing a crime, due to any mental
anomaly or alteration, cannot comprehend the unlawful nature of the
act, or act in line with that comprehension. A temporary mental disor-
der shall not result in exoneration from thepunishmentwhen provoked
by the subject in order to commit the offence, or when he would or
should have foreseen that it would be committed”.
According to these legal prescriptions, in order to be held criminally
responsible for a proscribed act, the defendant must have had two core
capabilities, occurring simultaneously and completely at the time of the
offense. First, the cognitive ability or capacity to appreciate (“compre-
hend”) that the act is against the law (“unlawful nature”), and thus, le-
gally wrong. This cognitive capacity implies both: the ability to
understand the act, according to general experience, as a prerequisite;
and that the act is against the law. At the same time, the defendant
must also have an average capacity to conform his behavior to the re-
quirements of the law (volitional, control or self-determination). The
capacity for criminal responsibility, therefore, is defined in terms of
the defendant's ability to be motivated by criminal law, which is the pri-
mary tool of deterrence from the commission of crimes (general pre-
vention) in consequentialist systems.
Under Common Law, the insanity defense, per se, is not recognized
universally. For instance, it is not admitted in three states of the U.S.A.
(Arizona, Utah and Montana) and in the states where it is accepted,
the requirements generally differ from those mentioned above,
resulting in a much narrower defense, as we will discuss below. An in-
sanity defense may also be based on a lack of rational capacity at the
time of the alleged act; however, it is generally admitted only for cogni-
tive impairments. The US Federal Insanity Defense Reform of 1984 cod-
ified, in Title 18 U.S. Code (USC) §17(a), the insanity defense as follows:“It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute
that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense,
the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was un-
able to appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.”
Thus, it is necessary to prove, that the defendant at the time of commit-
ting the crime, suffered a defect of themind, which prevented him to be
aware of the nature and quality of his actions (to know what he was
doing, without delusion) or that he lacked the ability to distinguish
right from wrong. In the case of a successful insanity defense in the
US, the individual is sent to a mental health institution for an indefinite
commitment, sentenced to prison, or both, depending on the specific
legislature of the governing jurisdiction (e.g. Farahany & Coleman,
2006).
Prior to the adoption of the Federal statutory standard of 1984, most
US Federal courts were using the proposal of the Model Penal Code
(MPC) by the American Law Institute in 1972. This text is highly com-
patible with the Spanish exoneration by reason of insanity; including
the volitional test. It states that, “A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if, at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of
the law”. This text was abandoned by the majority of the States after
the United States vs. Hinckley (1982) case, of the attempted assassina-
tion of President Ronald Reagan. The MPC, §4.01(2), also implicitly pro-
scribed the use of the insanity defense for psychopaths and ASPD, when
it stated: “As used in this article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do
not include an abnormality manifested only by a repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct” (see Robinson, Kussmaul, Stoddard,
Rudyak, & Kuersten, 2015; King-Ries, 2015 or Neville, 2010, for a com-
parative in USA, passim).
In England, according to theM'Naghten Rules, in a plea for an insan-
ity defense, in order to establish whether the defendant knew what he
was doing at the time of committing the criminal act: “the jurors
ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be
sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for
his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that
to establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, itmust be clearly prov-
en that, at the time of the committing of the act, the accused party was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong” (Daniel
M'Naghten's Case May 26, June 19 (1843) 4 St Tr NS 847). In England,
a successful plea of insanity will lead, depending on the discretional de-
cision of the judge, to hospitalization, supervision or an absolute dis-
charge. For murder, a partial defense, in the form of ‘diminished
responsibility’ is also possible, leading to a lesser charge of manslaugh-
ter. This is also the case in the U.S.A. Under The Coroners and Justice
Act 2001, this circumstance is grounded on a substantial impairment
of the defendant's mental capacity, such that it prevents him to under-
stand the nature of his own conduct, to form a rational judgment or to
exercise self-control (Ormerod, 2011).
In conclusion, the commonalities are: a) Criminal responsibility is
attributed based on the decision of the individual to commit a crime
(an unlawful act)when s/hewas able to avoid such behavior and act ac-
cording to the law. Consequently, criminal responsibility requires free
will or, at least, a compatibilistic view of human agency, which suggests
a deterministic or causal link between our will and our actions. b) A
mental insanity defense excuses criminal conduct based on the lack of
accountability or capacity for being held criminally responsible for a
proscribed act. c) Implicitly or indirectly, it is required that the mental
impairment has to be the ‘reason’ for or must be connected to the un-
lawful act, which implies that the crime has to be clearly related to the
defendant's mental impairments. d) Diminished responsibility can
also be considered in both systems by assessing culpability at sentenc-
ing. e) It is assessed whether the individual, at the time of the crime,
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committing the criminal act or not. An average mental capacity implies
a normative judgment about individuals' mental capacity compared to
what would be expected in an average person.
The differences are: The Civil Law system (Spain) adopts a primarily
preventive or consequentialist model. The insanity defense recognizes
both cognitive deficits and lack of volition or self-control. Also, this de-
fense is admissible based on a “mental anomaly or alteration”, which
can include brain abnormalities due to genetics or injury. The Common
Law system (particularly in the US), however, adopts a primarily retrib-
utive model. The insanity defense is more limited, because it requires a
proven mental disease or defect, making it more difficult to consider
brain abnormalities due to genetics or injury. Also, in the majority of
the states, the defense is built only on cognitive deficits; only a few
states recognize volitional deficits as well. But the most important dif-
ference, for our current concerns, is the relation between culpability
andmorality in each system. In the Continental System, liability is clear-
ly grounded on a formal or normative notion of illicitness or unlawful-
ness of the act, appealing to what is legally right or wrong, without
direct reference to social morality. However, Common Law mostly
keeps an ambiguous relation (or in fact confusion) between ‘criminality’
and social ‘morality’, by linking the comprehension of the ‘wrongful-
ness’ of the act to terms like ‘wrong’ or ‘right’. We will come back to
this point, because it is key for the legal treatment of psychopathy.
4. Accountability and psychopathy: key points of reference
4.1. The time of assessment of accountability
The assessment of accountability has to bewith reference to the time
of committing the crime, unless the defendant had compromised his ca-
pacity intentionally (‘guilty mind’) or through negligence. Regarding
psychopathy, at first glance, this requirement does not appear problem-
atic, given its developmental nature, its stability from childhood, partic-
ularly the presence of CU traits (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2011; Frick, Cornell,
Barry, Bodin, & Dane, 2003; Loney, Taylor, Butler, & Iacono, 2007;
Lynam, Caspi, Moffitt, Loeber, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 2007) and the
fact that it is described as a permanent state, which defines the person-
ality and behavior of afflicted individuals.
Leaving aside the explanation of psychopathy as an adaptive life
strategy (as opposed to a disorder), consistentwith evolutionary theory
(e.g., Book, Quinsey, & Langford, 2007; Crawford& Salmon, 2002; Glenn,
Kurzban, & Raine, 2011), there seems to be some consensus that psy-
chopathy, particularly primary or that which is associated with Factor
1 PCL-R, may have a predominantly genetic etiology, accounting on av-
erage for 40 to 60% of the variance (Viding, Blair, Moffitt, & Plomin,
2005). However, sociopathy, or Factor 2-related psychopathy, has
been described as the final product of the interaction between environ-
mental factors and certain genetic conditions; in other words: a G × E
interaction (Poythress, Skeem, & Lilienfeld, 2006). However, the candi-
date genes underlying CU traits remain unknown (see Viding &
McCrory, 2012), as do the environmental factorsmoderating genetic in-
fluences, such as parental socioeconomic background, parenting prac-
tices or trauma (see Cummings, 2015; Farrington, 1985; Tamatea,
2015, on emerging epigenetics; Sadeh et al., 2010, for all).
4.2. Biological requirement
The SPC requires that the lack of accountability or capacity for culpa-
bility is due to mental anomaly or impairment (alteration). This abnor-
mal mental state would only require proof (by the defendant) of a
pathological structure or activity of the brain, even with unknown
causes. This is the so-called ‘biological element’ of the insanity defense.
In contrast, other legal systems require a diagnosable mental illness, as
in the U.S. Code or M'Naghten Rules referred above. It is necessary,
then, to establish the implications and possibilities based on bothsystems to consider the admission of psychopathy under the insanity
defense. This concept is much broader than the previous legal require-
ment for a diagnosable ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disorder’, which is
still in use in other systems.
4.2.1. Systems requiring diagnosable mental illness
By requiring “a severemental disease or defect” [ex T.18USC §17(a)]
or “a defect of reason, from disease of the mind” (the M'Naghten rule),
the law reduces the applicability of this circumstance to the presence
of a diagnosable mental disorder. This raises two key problems: First,
the potential difficulties for diagnosing this disorder arising from the
ambiguous and dual notion of psychopathy; second, the lack of general
recognition of such a condition in the most commonly used diagnostic
manuals.
Regarding the first issue, the PCL-R is, on one hand, highly controver-
sial in the literature and, on the other, the tool most commonly used in
court, to diagnose psychopathy and also to identify and measure crimi-
nal dangerousness, not only in psychopaths but potentially others
(Hare, 2016). The PCL-R, however, has been criticized both for its taxo-
nomic structure and for overestimating psychopathy based on an over-
emphasis on behavioral antisocial traits. There is an argument that it is
also tautological with regard to antisocial/criminal behavior (Beaver,
Boutwell, Barnes, Vaughn, & DeLisi, 2015; Edens, Marcus, & Vaughn,
2011; Skeem& Cooke, 2010), which is seen as both a core characteristic
and an outcome. This is particularly problematic not only for the con-
cept itself (or the dual underlying profile), but also because it inflates
the correlation between psychopathy and antisocial/criminal behavior,
hence dangerousness. At the same time, again paradoxically, this tool
was conceived as a diagnostic tool by Hare and yet it is most widely
used in research as opposed to clinical practice, as it is inconsistent
with the DSM-5, Section 2 definition of psychopathy and has not been
studied in relation to Section 3.
The second, and more important problem, is that psychopathy is not
directly recognized as a disorder by either the DSM-5 or ICD-10, the two
most widely used internationally recognized diagnostic manuals. In the
DSM-5, the diagnostic reference manual published by the American Psy-
chiatric Association, antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and conduct
disorder (CD) are clearly recognized, whereas psychopathy (the defini-
tional CU traits, at least) only appears as a variant of these disorders.
Moreover, in the DSM-5, Section 2, which presents the traditional cate-
gorical classification of disorders, the definitions of psychopathy,
sociopathy and ASPD lack clear differentiation. ASPD (in adulthood) or
CD (in juveniles), in short, would be the common clinical diagnoses, but
only some of these antisocial individuals would also have psychopathic
traits, and show limited prosocial emotions. Specifically, to qualify for
‘psychopathic traits’, an individual with CD or ASPD must display at
least two of the following traits persistently and across different contexts:
“lack of remorse or guilt”, “callous–lack of empathy”, being “unconcerned
about performance” and exhibiting “shallow or deficient affect”. Based on
the DSM-5, Section 2, this specifier would cover two personality types:
‘callous–unemotional’, and ‘thrill seeking, fearless and insensitive to
punishment’.
Section 3 of thismanual is a new addition to the DSM that was intro-
duced during themost recent revision in 2013. It offers a supplementa-
ry, dimensional model of personality pathology, operationalized and
measured through the Personality Inventory (PID-5; Krueger et al.,
2011) specifically developed for the DSM-5. Recent studies have sup-
ported the utility of the Section 3 psychopathy specifier to capture
each of the key facets of psychopathy as specified in the Triarchic
Model of psychopathy (e.g., Anderson, Sellbom, Wygant, Salekin, &
Krueger, 2014; Strickland, Drislane, Lucy, Krueger, & Patrick, 2013).
Thus, the DSM-5 represents a significant improvement on previous ver-
sions of the DSM,which focused on the behavioral rather than the affec-
tive and interpersonal, in other words ‘core’ traits of psychopathy.
However, these psychopathy traits continue to be a mere specifier to
ASPD or CD, both of which are disorders capturing primarily antisocial
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which antisocial behaviors are not only a key component of the con-
struct, but also the outcome of it. In its current format, the DSM-5 still
does not enable ‘successful psychopaths’ to be identified in any way.
Moreover, Section 3 of the DSM-5 has only been put forward as an
emergingmodel for use in clinical research. It has not, to our knowledge,
been utilized or developed to be utilized in courts. Similarly, its utility
has not been evaluated in the context of the PCL-R, to date the most
widely used assessment tool in courts, which causes perplexity for
legal operators.
A similar classification system, the International Classification of Dis-
eases: Classification of Mental and Behavioral Disorders 10, the Revi-
sions (ICD-10), is published by the World Health Organization and
utilized world-wide. Like the DSM, the ICD-10 does not distinguish a
clear category for psychopathy. Instead, a parallel disorder to ASPD, dis-
social personality disorder (DPD) is utilized to classify antisocial individ-
uals, with a specifier which includes lack of empathy and relationship
instability. A new updated version of the ICD, ICD-11 is due to be re-
leased in 2017. The beta-version available online suggests that it has
adapted a dimensional approach to personality disorders with a differ-
entiation of mild, moderate and severe on a range of characteristics. It
is not clear, however, how psychopathy will be captured. Overall, both
classification systems have been widely criticized for not being suffi-
ciently evidence based (e.g., Tyrer, 2013).
It is paradoxical that, while the DSM-5 and ICD-10 only identify psy-
chopathy at the level of ‘traits’; researchers, the general public, the
media and those who use the term in the legal system, view individuals
either as psychopaths or not. But more importantly, as we explore here,
the fact that psychopathy is not recognized as a diagnosable disorder
makes it extremely difficult to include psychopathy under the biological
requirement of the insanity defense in those systems which require a
diagnosable mental illness (see Campbell, 1990 for all). At the same
time, it sends an affirmative message to courts about the traditional
‘way of being’ viewof psychopathy and about negating its consideration
under any excuse or mitigation.
4.2.2. Systems requiring just a mental anomaly or alteration
The concept of abnormality or mental alteration has a wider mean-
ing, as it firstly implies the acceptance of the ‘brain’ and ‘mind’ as an in-
divisible whole (Damasio, 1994). Also, its wording allows for any
pathological brain deficit either structural or functional, in addition to
any other mental impairment without a documented association with
brain damage or dysfunction, as might be for example evident in the
case of post-traumatic stress syndrome. What matters is whether the
psychological functioning of the defendant was anomalous (pathologi-
cal) or not at the time of the crime, compared to what is scientifically
considered normal, or average in the general population. However,
even for those legal systems, such as the SPC, which only require amen-
tal anomaly or alteration for addressing the biological element of the in-
sanity defense, the inclusion of psychopathy appears to be problematic.
As we will show below, this is because the neurobiological markers of
psychopathy are far from being clear or generally accepted in the
literature. This circumstance, together with the problems related to
the psychological construct itself (see above), makes it very difficult to
document this condition in courts.
4.2.2.1. Neurobiological markers of psychopathy. Much of the literature
points to structural impairments in the fronto-limbic system, with re-
duced volumes and activity in the amygdala and the orbitofrontal and
ventromedial pre-frontal cortex (VmPFC) in individuals who score
highly on traits of psychopathy (e.g., Contreras-Rodríguez et al., 2015;
Gao, Glenn, Schug, Yang, & Raine, 2009; Raine & Yang, 2006a;
Umbach, Berryessa, & Raine, 2015; Yang & Raine, 2009).
Hypoactivity in the amygdala has been linked to fearlessness, im-
pairments in stimulus-reinforcement learning and in responses to
emotional expressions, particularly fearful expressions, all thoughtto be core components of psychopathy (Blair, 2008; Ermer, Cope,
Nyalakanti, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 2012; Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009;
Lykken, 1957, 2006; Umbach et al., 2015). In addition, concurrent im-
pairment inVmPFC, responsible for deficits in executive functioning (in-
cluding learning, behavioral flexibility, working memory and sustained
attention; Puig & Gulledge, 2011), indicates that psychopaths may also
have impaired decision-making through “their inability to “tie” the
brain's cognitive and emotional networks together” (Walsh & Bolen
2012, p.157; Patrick, 2006).
The combination of these impairments may explain the tendency of
psychopaths, at least those scoring high on Factor 1, to bemore likely to
exhibit instrumental aggression than reactive aggression (more com-
mon, however, on PCL-R Factor 2 individuals). Instrumental aggression
may be the result of a distorted representation of the costs of the behav-
ior. The amygdala is critical for stimulus reinforcement learning and for
feeding reinforcement expectancy information to the OFC, enabling ef-
fective decision-making to occur. When both of these critical processes
are disrupted in an individual, she/he has difficulties with socialization
(Blair, 2007, 2010a; Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005 regarding the role of
amygdala and VmPFC in moral judgment, see Shenhav & Greene,
2014). Blair (2010a) points out that instrumental aggression is, as
goal-directed behavior, mediated by the motor cortex and caudate
and implies that the individual chooses an antisocial behavior instead
of a prosocial one.
Functionally, reduced connectivity between the amygdala and PFC
has been also observed. Craig et al. (2009) found significant correlations
between reduced UF (uncinate fasciculus) volume and PCL-R Factor 2
scores. The reduced connectivity is related to impulsivity and lack of
socio-emotional integration and to antisocial behavior (Motzkin,
Newman, Kiehl, & Koenigs, 2011). Raine (2013, p. 121) hypothesized
that “reduced connections between these regions may mean that
(1) emotion-related information from the amygdala that signals cues
of threat, risk or harm to others, may not be able to reach cortical
areas in order to inform decision making, resulting in the callousness,
lack of empathy, risk taking, and instrumental aggression observed in
psychopathy, and (2) cortical regionsmay be less able to send inhibitory
signals to subcortical regions, resulting in deficits in emotion regulation
and inhibition”.
Ventral striatum impairments may also be observed in those who
score high on measures/traits of psychopathy (Blair, 2013; Buckholtz
et al., 2010; Glenn& Yang, 2012), resulting in increased sensitivity to re-
ward, and decreased sensitivity to punishment. It is possible that an
over-reactive reward system, derived from striatum abnormalities,
contributes further to poor decision-making processes (related to in-
strumental aggression). In line with this, Hiatt and Newman (2006)
suggested that an over-reactive reward system may explain passive-
avoidance responses and ignoring external emotion-related cues as
punishment.
Finally, other neural systems (such as the hippocampus, insula, and
anterior cingulate cortex) may also be compromised in individuals
with psychopathic traits, but findings related to these are not conclusive
(e.g., Blair, 2010a; Yang et al., 2015). Importantly, experts in the field
have repeatedly highlighted that none of the biological dysfunctions
linked to psychopathy, are associated exclusively with psychopathy
(e.g., Wahlund & Kristiansson, 2009; Yang & Raine, 2009). In fact, as
Hardcastle (2013) emphasizes, to date, we have little consistent evi-
dence for any specific biological or social correlates of psychopathy.
4.2.2.2. Contradictions. Themost consistent finding regarding neural cor-
relates of psychopathy is low reactivity in the amygdala and poor con-
nectivity between this structure and the PFC, at least for Factor 2
related individuals. This hypoactivity of the amygdala implies and ex-
plains the low sensitivity to fear and threat and the poorer emotional re-
sponses which have been observed in psychopathic individuals. This
seems to be consistent with “low fear hypothesis”, low sensitivity to
punishment or CU traits. On the other hand, the impairments in the
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with the amygdala may also explain difficulties in emotional-learning
processes and low sensitivity to punishment and consequent problems
for acquiring social emotions and for inadequate socialization in psy-
chopaths. This is also consistent with the lack of both empathy and
fear of punishment evidenced in psychopaths. Taken together, along
with a potentially over-reactive reward system, these findings are also
consistent with instrumental aggression, considered prevalent in psy-
chopathic individuals, at least, in those who could be considered either
Factor 1 or ‘primary’ psychopaths.
However, in our opinion, these findings foreground important con-
tradictions and inconsistencies in the literature and between the psy-
chological/psychiatric explanations of psychopathy:
1. The nature of the hypothesized impairment in the PFC of psycho-
paths remains unclear. It seems that an under-responsive amygdala
might lead to a limited accumulation of emotional knowledge. At
the same time, ‘primary’ psychopaths (Factor 1) are described as
having average or above average ‘intelligence’ and executive func-
tions, which appears highly contradictory with the affirmation that
they have an impaired PFC and poor decision-making (given that ex-
ecutive functions are thought to be mediated by the PFC).
2. Also, it seems that neurocognitive impairments are foundonly in ‘un-
successful’ psychopaths (Yang et al., 2005; Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga
and Narr, 2010; Yang, Wong et al., 2010; Gao & Raine, 2010), that is,
in individualswhowould fall into the PCL-R Factor 2 group or be ‘sec-
ondary’ psychopaths, if both terms were taken as synonymous. In
fact, impairments in connectivity between the fronto-limbic struc-
tures have been observed in this specific type of psychopath. The
brain regions primarily involved in response to threat seem to be
the medial and orbital frontal cortex, the amygdala, the hypothala-
mus, and the periaqueductal gray (Blair, 2010b). Additionally, a
large component of reactive aggression is driven by the autonomic
nervous system. Theories have been developed outlining the effects
of early trauma experienced by ‘secondary’ psychopaths and its im-
pact on brain regions involved in responses to threat which in turn
leads to loss of control, impulsivity and hence reactive aggression
(e.g., Vaughn, Edens, et al., 2009).
Therefore, the problem of internal contradictions among the find-
ings and the paradoxical psychological profiles of these individuals re-
mains, due to the fact that low reactivity of the amygdala, low
emotional responses and instrumental aggression are hard to reconcile
with impulsivity and disinhibition. They point in opposite directions as
do instrumental and reactive aggression. Paradoxically, the findings
show that both poor connectivity between the amygdala and the frontal
lobe and impairments in the prefrontal cortex, result in deficits of emo-
tion regulation and inhibition: impulsivity. In fact, damage in the orbito-
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex has been related to ‘acquired psy-
chopathy’ (resulting frombrain injury) andwith traits such as impulsiv-
ity, irresponsibility, disinhibited behavior, disregard for social rules or
for others' feelings, as well as poor decision-making in emotional
tasks. These traits are consistent with those observed in the well-
known 19th century case of Phineas Gage (Damasio, Grabowski,
Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994), who suffered major personality
changes following an accident in which a large iron rod went
through his head and severely damaged his left frontal lobe. But at the
same time, with regard to impulsivity and again paradoxically, litera-
ture has not found any relation between the 2-repeat allele of the
MAOA gene promoter polymorphism (strongly associated with impul-
sivity and reactive aggression) and psychopathy (Beaver et al., 2013).
Moreover, some studies even suggest that “the blunt assertion that
“psychopaths are impulsive” is no longer defensible” (Poythress &
Hall, 2011).
In short: these findings suggest that psychopaths exhibit both high
and low levels of anxiety; are stable and impulsive individuals; andare likely to engage in instrumental and reactive emotional responses…
at the same time.
In addition, these findings are also in contrast to the two profiles un-
derlying the psychological construct of psychopathy, because they are
more explicative of the Factor 1 related profile of psychopathy, while
they would correspond only to Factor 2 associated individuals, if it can
be derived that both categories are the best correspondence for success-
ful and unsuccessful psychopaths, referred to by the literature in this
context.
In light of this, it is worth considering that some researchers have
suggested that physiological impairmentsmay be related only to unsuc-
cessful psychopaths (Yang et al., 2005; Yang, Raine, et al., 2010; Yang,
Wong et al., 2010; Gao & Raine, 2010). It is more likely that the two
‘types’ of psychopaths would only share decreased emotional empathy.
However, behavioral modulation, executive functioning and decision-
making point in opposite directions, suggesting deficits only in ‘unsuc-
cessful’ psychopaths. At the same time, impairments in the OFC/amyg-
dala system and cognitive regions such as the PFC seem to be deficient
only for ‘unsuccessful’ psychopaths, while they are intact or enhanced
in ‘successful’ psychopaths. Of course, both groups would also show
very relevant behavioral differences; unsuccessful psychopaths are
more likely to engage in ‘blue collar crime’ and physical violence, and
to score higher on the antisocial features of psychopathy; whereas ‘suc-
cessful’ psychopaths, would be more prone to ‘white collar crime’ and
relational aggression, and would score higher on the interpersonal fea-
tures of psychopathy (see Glenn & Raine, 2014, summarizing the di-
verging markers and traits).
4.2.2.3. Summary. From a legal perspective, reflection on the outlined
findings takes us back to the important question of whether both
types of individuals are truly and only psychopaths or not (Skeem
et al., 2011:115) andwhether Factor 1 and Factor 2 related psychopathy
is the same ‘disorder’ or not. The key emerging question is, then,wheth-
er they both should be considered as equal under the law. It seems to us
that: either the reported neural impairments are not the biological
markers of psychopathy (given that they should be common to all psy-
chopaths) and thus they cannot be used as evidence of amental impair-
ment for psychopathy; or that Factor 2 individuals might have another
‘disorder’ instead of or in addition to psychopathy, characterized by
the combination of emotional and cognitive impairments, and that
such a pathology would also express itself as a psychopathic traits vari-
ant. In either case, psychopathy by itself, would not be enough to meet
the biological requirement.
In fact, this conclusion would be consistent with the DSM-5, and
with the distinction between ‘primary’ psychopathy and ‘secondary’
psychopathy or between ‘psychopathy’ and ‘sociopathy’. Also, it would
be less problematic in relation to the concept of ‘successful psycho-
paths’, who clearly would not meet the criteria for the insanity defense.
This clear differentiation is presented by the bifactor proposed by
Patrick, Hicks, Nichol and Krueger (2007), who suggest that there are
two temperamental features and neural phenotypic correlates underly-
ing the interpersonal–affective and the antisocial factors of psychopa-
thy. CU traits should reflect impairments in emotional reactivity,
particularly related to fear, but the antisocial component, and concur-
rent impairments in the PFC, would be related to negative affectivity
and impulsivity or impulse-control problems, and subsequently to a di-
minished decision-making process (Patrick, 2007).
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that despite these evident
difficulties, theoretically, the global category of ‘psychopaths’ may
meet, according to these findings, the legal criteria for an ‘anomaly or
mental alteration’, resulting in two different legal profiles, one for each
type of psychopathy. In such a potential scenario, it would first be nec-
essary to establish the extent of hyporeactivity of the amygdala that can
be considered pathological, in order to potentially categorize (and in-
clude) ‘successful psychopaths’. Without such clarification, in line with
current research, successful psychopaths (primary or Factor 1-related
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first criterion under the current understanding of the insanity defense
or any other related mitigations.
However, the situation for ‘unsuccessful psychopaths’ (secondary psy-
chopaths or Factor 2-related individuals) could be seen differently. They
seem to show cognitive and volitional impairments, at least, in the most
severe cases and therefore, they might be held (fully or partially) non-
responsible or be considered formitigation under the current law. Impor-
tantly, it ought to be highlighted that Factor 2 individuals would meet
these criteria not for the neural impairments related to definitional CU
traits per se, but for the reported (but not well-defined) global impair-
ments in the prefrontal cortex and its connectivity with the amygdala
(see similar proposal, Sifferd & Hirstein, 2013). Nevertheless, in order to
prove such circumstance in courts, a clear identification of the specific
biomarker(s) of unsuccessful psychopaths appears strongly necessary.
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the defense also requires that
the alleged act was “due to” the mental anomaly or alteration. This
means that the dysfunctional behavioral pattern associated with psy-
chopathy cannot be generalized to all crimes, but only to those corre-
sponding with this ‘disorder’. This also seems particularly problematic,
because psychopaths have been found to engage in both instrumental
aggression/violence and impulsive/reactive aggression/violence. For
the law, it is also necessary to clarify whether the supposed relation be-
tween instrumental aggression and psychopathy is consistent for all
psychopaths or whether Factor 2-related individuals would be more
prone to engaging in impulsive–frustration-based violence. It is easy
to imagine how different would appear a case with behaviors involving
each type of violence.
In fact, the form and function of aggression and violence has been
identified in the literature as a differentiating feature between the two
types of ‘psychopathy’ (e.g. Falkenbach, Poythress, & Creevy, 2008;
Kimonis, Skeem, Cauffman, & Dmitrieva, 2011). Specifically, research ev-
idence suggests (e.g. Falkenbach et al., 2008; Kimonis et al., 2011; Skeem,
Poythress, Edens, Lilienfeld, & Cale, 2003) that ‘primary’ psychopaths en-
gage more in ‘instrumental’ aggression, that is premeditated, proactive
aggression, aimed toward satisfying a usually self-gratifying goal
(Dodge & Crick, 1990), while ‘secondary’ psychopaths engage more in
‘reactive’ aggression, that is, a compulsive and emotionally charged hos-
tile behavior in response to frustration, danger or a perceived threat
(Berkowitz, 1983; Blair, 2010b). Reactive aggression, which is closely
linked to impulsivity, has been linked to a wide range of other disorders
(e.g., ADHD; Murray, Obsuth, Zirk-Sadowski, Ribeaud, & Eisner, 2016).
On the other hand, the callous–unemotional nature, inherent to ‘pri-
mary’ psychopaths, predisposes them to use others and engage in
aggression and violence to meet their own needs in the form of ‘instru-
mental aggression’. Emotions are described as playing a minimal role in
this type of aggression (Glenn & Raine, 2009). Importantly, when mea-
sured overall, psychopathy has been found to be related predominantly
to instrumental violence (e.g. Bezdjian, Tuvblad, Raine, & Baker, 2011;
Chase, O'Leary, & Heyman, 2001; Lehmann & Ittel, 2012; Porter &
Woodworth, 2007). In fact, one study (Reidy, Shelley-Tremblay, &
Lilienfeld, 2011) identified psychopathy as a form of protective factor
against reactive aggression.When looking at individual factors, a hand-
ful ofmeta-analyses found that Factor 2 of the PCL-R (e.g., Bezdjian et al.,
2011; Declercq,Willemsen, Audenaert, & Verhaeghe, 2012) ismore pre-
dictive of general violence than Factor 1. However, when looking at
types of violence, a recent meta-analysis (Blais et al., 2014), based on
reviewing 53 studies, found that compared to Factor 2, Factor 1 (most
consistentwith ‘primary’ psychopathy) is a stronger predictor of instru-
mental aggression, while Factor 2 (most consistent with ‘secondary’
psychopathy) is a stronger predictor of reactive aggression.
4.3. Normative element: cognitive or volitional impairments
In order to be considered accountable, the defendant has to be able
to understand that what he is doing is unlawful. At the same time, hehas to be able to control the illicit impulses, showing an average capacity
to act in line with that comprehension. Therefore, for the law, brain ab-
normalities alone represent mere individual differences, which should
not receive any special legal treatment. In our case, the supposed bio-
markers of psychopathy shall not be considered for an insanity defense
or mitigation, unless they specifically affect the cognitive or volitional
capacity, as it is required by the law.
At the same time, accountability is dimensional, and it is necessary to
differentiate different levels of accountability, andprove it, aswell as the
extent to which the defendant's mind was impaired at the time of the
crime. Taking the case of the Spanish criminal law as example, impair-
ments in the defendant's mental state might lead to three possibilities:
A) First, an insanity defense (“eximente completa de anomalía o
alteración psíquica”), when the defendant is found to be not criminally
accountable for the offense due to having acted as a non-rational agent,
in a fully impaired or severely abnormal state of mind in the moment of
the crime, which makes him impervious to criminal rules. Thus, the de-
fendant was not aware of his actions or was not able to distinguish legal
‘right’ from ‘wrong’. In such situations, evidence must be presented to
prove that the defendant does not understand the illicit meaning of
the act (the “nature and quality” of the act and that it was legally
wrong). A full insanity defense is also recognized, if evidence is present-
ed that the defendant completely lacks the capacity to control his crim-
inal impulses, with or without concurrent cognitive impairments. In
these situations, the defendant is not held criminally responsible but
may be seen as criminally dangerous (presenting high risk for recidi-
vism). As a result, they do not receive a prison sentence but can be
sent to a secure-psychiatric hospital to ensure public safety and to pro-
vide them with treatment/rehabilitation. B) The second option is a par-
tial or incomplete insanity defense (“eximente incompleta de anomalía
o alteración psíquica”), when the defendant is found to have significant-
ly diminished responsibility. However, this would not warrant a full in-
sanity defense. In this case, generally, the individual is sentenced to a
combination of mitigated punishment and security including crimi-
nal commitment (mostly in prison…) as well as reformative mea-
sures in the form of treatment resources, such as psychological
treatment for drug-abuse. The type of rehabilitation treatment used
will depend on what appears necessary for decreasing the risk of re-
cidivism. C) Finally, if accountability is found to be diminished to an
even lesser extent (in cognitive or control capacities), a mitigation
(“atenuante”) is also possible in sentencing. The potential rehabili-
tating treatment would be provided under the general conditions
of the Spanish penitentiary system.
Regarding psychopathy, CU-traits do not, by themselves, impact
upon the required capacities, at least, not under the traditional interpre-
tation of the insanity defense, which requires only a cognitive under-
standing of the wrongfulness (against the law) of the act. Self-control
impairment (impulsivity) has not been identified as specific to those
with high levels of CU-traits. Consequently, Factor 1-related psychopa-
thy does not meet the criteria, again, for an insanity defense or any
other mitigation. As we highlighted throughout, findings are contradic-
tory regarding Factor 2 individuals and need to be clarified. On one
hand, impairments in the fronto-limbic system lead to poor and instru-
mental decision-making in moral situations; on the other hand, those
impairments, and in particular the limited connectivity between
fronto-limbic structures, have been shown to be related to impulsivity.
Impaired self-control/impulsivity might meet the criteria for impaired
or limited volitional capacity. The problem is, that with unresolved con-
tradictions over essential details and the lack of a dominant view in the
literature, these findings do not satisfy the “rules of evidence” (see, Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 2015, Rule 702, for example). And moreover,
again, such potential diminished responsibility in Factor 2 individuals
does not reflect what is often seen as the core feature of psychopathy:
the definitional CU traits.
Finally, for an accurate comprehension of the normative element of
the insanity defense, and particularly regarding psychopathy, it is also
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is the distinction between ‘comprehend’ and ‘appreciate’, as they are
broader terms than ‘know’ or ‘distinguish’ and permit finer gradation
of the nuances of disabilities. The second, and this is key for psychopa-
thy, is that the references to “the unlawful nature of the act” (SPC) or
to “criminality of his conduct” (MPC) appeal to amore legalistic concep-
tion of right and wrong. Accountability is built on the bases of a norma-
tive responsibility and requires a standard capacity to comprehend that
the alleged act is against the law and, thus, prohibited and is also the ca-
pacity for self-control to obey the law and avoid criminal behavior, no
matter the reason. The law, of course, responds to moral decisions of
criminal policy, regarding social values, interests, and preventive goals.
Specifically concerning accountability, the law translates into a norma-
tive decision, what appears acceptable in order to be held criminally re-
sponsible, in a specific society and at a specific time. That is, it
establishes theminimum conditions to be considered, legally, a ‘rational
agent’, as it is expected in the general population. Accountability, there-
fore, is considered prior to criminal responsibility. It is presumed for ev-
eryone, unless proven otherwise. If this standard capability is present,
criminal responsibility is modulated by “mens rea” (guilty mind,
recklessness or negligence) and the absence of any full or partial moti-
vational excuse, for instance, duress. However, the expression “the
wrongfulness of his act” (USC), unless interpreted as synonymous
with legal “wrongfulness”, evokes a morally infused understanding of
accountability and it seems to appeal to a more internal commitment
to the moral values underlying the law. This is important to understand
and keep in mind, particularly with regard to psychopathy, in order to
analyze (see below in the next section) the potential role of the emotion
in the construct of criminal accountability.
5. Rethinking insanity defense? Emotion, human rationality and
criminal responsibility
The legal formulation of the insanity defense has been challenged by
advances in neuroscience and genetics (Morse, 2008a), including the
external notion of underlying ‘free will’ (Feijoo Sánchez, 2012; Greene
&Cohen, 2004).We have already pointed out that evidence fromneuro-
science forces us to question the failure of the insanity defense in some
legal systems to recognize brain abnormalities and/or volitional capaci-
ty. However, regarding psychopathy, the key, specific, and more chal-
lenging issue is related to the role of ‘emotions’ in a potential new
interpretation of the insanity defense (Morse, 2008b; Blair, 2008,
Cancio Meliá, 2013; Glenn & Raine, 2014, among others).
Nowadays, science recognizes that both emotion and cognition,
guide human rationality (Damasio, 1994) and that emotion is core in
moral judgment and the moral decision-making process (Greene,
2003, 2004; Shenhav & Greene, 2014, for all). Moral behavior may be
primarily guided by unconscious emotional processes (Haidt, 2001).
Therefore, neural impairments in areas involving emotion regulation
would compromise our moral judgments, as is suggested by studies of
individuals with damage in the relevant brain areas (Koenigs et al.,
2007).
This is a core point for psychopathy, given that the biomarkers for
this ‘disorder’, particularly for ‘unsuccessful psychopaths’, are defined,
precisely, by structural and functional impairments in brain areas in-
volved in emotional moral responses (particularly involving harm to
others) and decision-making processes (e.g. Raine & Yang, 2006b). Ac-
cordingly, Raine and Yang (2006b) have hypothesized that the lack of
emotional empathy, in addition to brain impairments in the regions re-
sponsible for cognitive reasoning, may compromise neural circuits un-
derlying moral decision-making. As a result, psychopaths may have a
compromised capacity for rational agency, at least, for moral judgment,
and may have significant implications for criminal responsibility. As
Glenn and Raine (2014) pointed out, even though psychopaths may
be able to cognitively distinguish right from wrong, they may lack the
necessary emotions to motivate them to behave morally. In theiropinion, the “law should accommodate the increasing psychological
and neuroscientific evidence that emotional capacity is an important
factor for translating factual knowledge about right and wrong into
moral behavior” (p. 166, see also Levy, 2007; Vierra, 2016).
In our view, leaving aside now the problematic interpretation of the
findings already discussed, the lack of or reduced capacity formoral rea-
soning in psychopaths (Lykken, 2000; Walsh & Bolen, 2012) could ini-
tially appear as relevant for criminal law, based upon the functional
meaning of accountability: the assessment of the individual's capacity
to be motivated by the law. Psychopathy would imply a more or less
limited emotional (not cognitive) socialization and, consequently, diffi-
culties in responding to both integrative and intimidatory preventive
strategies of the law (see Roxin, 2012; also Feijoo Sánchez, 2007). Crim-
inal law primarily aims to prevent crimes through integrative strategies
based on a positive message sent by the law: an act is prohibited be-
cause of the need to protect a social good or interest, which is important
and worthy, for example, life. Also, with the intimidatory prevention
strategy (since Feuerbach, 1801, 1832:13 and ff. and recently deterrence
theory), the law relies on the fear of the legal consequences of the crim-
inal behavior in order to inhibit criminal impulses, for example, punish-
ment or other reputational social costs. But of course, if psychopaths are
refractory to moral socialization, it is clear that they will fail to be moti-
vated by the law, because they lack the biological capacity for that.
This difficult topic was initially addressed by Stephan Morse in
2008 concluding that the current legal treatment of psychopaths is
morally incorrect and it should be reformed. In his opinion, psycho-
paths lack moral rationality and, thus, severe psychopaths should
be excused from their crimes, because they do not deserve blame
and punishment. Morse proposed alternative forms of social control
for psychopaths, such as involuntary civil commitment. He sug-
gested that due to their lack of empathy and the fact that they do
not get the point of morality psychopaths are not responsive to
moral reasons to avoid crime. Morse further maintained that psycho-
paths “do not have the capacity for moral rationality, at least when
their behavior implicates moral concerns, and thus they are not re-
sponsible. They have no access to the most rational reasons to be-
have well.” (p. 208). Severe psychopaths would not be considered
“members of the moral community and subjects to blame and pun-
ishment” (p. 209), because they would have a compromised ratio-
nality and, consequently, also volitional capacity.
Other authors (e.g., Caouette, 2013), while acknowledging that psy-
chopathsmay havemore difficulties in actingmorally, do not think that
it would mean, necessarily, that they cannot do so. Furthermore, the
typical psychopath is sufficiently in touch with reality as to be able to
control his or her impulses, make decisions and engage in intentional
action (Rich, 2013). Some (e.g., Hardcastle, 2015) contend that one's ac-
tual moral code has nothing to do with legal criminal responsibility;
others (e.g., Hare & Neuman, 2010) believe that even though psycho-
pathsmight not control their behaviormorally, they can control it ratio-
nally, because they understand what they are doing and have cogent
reasons for what they do. It has also been posited that psychopaths
would form moral judgments utilizing cognitive processes only (Cima,
Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Zhong, 2013).
In our view, firstly, it has not been established that psychopaths are
indifferent to punishment. If they are not motivated by fear, then they
may be by self-interest. It is clear that they care about their freedom.
But more importantly, the key questions regarding this problem are:
Is the decision of committing a crime just a moral decision for the indi-
vidual? Does the law require an internal commitment to the moral
values underlying the law? Should the law require that, given that emo-
tion and cognition guide human rationality? In our opinion: No.
Briefly: “felonies or misdemeanours are intentional or negligent ac-
tions or omissions punishable by Law” (art. 10 SPC). The law is saying
that a delict is what the law says that it is. Thus, it is saying that the
wrongfulness of an act must be considered as legal wrongfulness, not
moral. The unlawfulness of an alleged act is (and ought to be)
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against what society, a group or an individual may consider ‘morally’
good or bad. It may be particularly difficult to define what is or is not
moral, in our societies today, which are characterized by multicultural-
ism and the need for respecting minorities. In addition, criminal law
should not protect ‘morals’, but public safety, the citizens' key constitu-
tional rights and other key social rules, through highly consensual and
democratic statutes (see, Mezger, 1933; Amelung, 1972; Calliess,
1974; González Rus, 1983). Of course, illegal acts includematerial trans-
gressions (harm, injury or risk) against key social values or social rules
(see Mir Puig, 2004, 2008), but the decision about what is worthy of
protection is made a priori, a policy decision. What is already protected
is a coercive law, which must be just: obeyed.
In response to this, criminal responsibility is the result of an imputa-
tion judgment of the defendant regarding the illicit act. The defendant is
responsible, therefore, for not obeying the command of the law, when
he was, in accordance with the normative standard, able to do so. The
legal specification of who is able to ‘do so’ reflects, in reality, what
each society and enforcement system consider as an acceptable excuse
of the general conditions for criminal responsibility. That explains the
differences between countries regarding, for example, the accountabili-
ty of minors, mentally ill individuals or the legal treatment of individ-
uals with addictions. Therefore, the question of whether the emotional
component of human rationality should be considered or not does not
have a direct legal response derived from what science can tell us
about this. It will be, always, a normative response, which will depend
on what is or can be accepted by a society, according to the dominant
morality, and the functional consequences of changes to the law.
So, should the legal treatment of psychopaths be changed, by re-
interpreting the insanity defense? In our opinion, no. Should they be ex-
onerated, because, despite knowing that an act is prohibited or required,
they do not care about the material harm of the forbidden act nor the
punishment? In our opinion, no. Should those who are not internally
and morally committed to the law, be held responsible for their act?
In our opinion, clearly: yes.
First of all, because, asMorse also recognizes (2008:209), such an ar-
gumentwould theoretically lead to excusing ormitigating ‘acculturated
psychopaths’ for their specific crimes. Thiswould apply to fanatics, early
indoctrinated terrorists or ‘per conviction’ criminals, who committed
their crimes considering the others, basically, as ‘enemies’, ‘subhumans’,
‘collateral’ damage, or just irrelevants. It would also exonerate ‘machos’
in engaging in gender violence or people ideologically in favor of abor-
tion or euthanasia (if the law prohibits them). Where would be the
limit? Because all of them committed their crimes fully convinced that
they are actingmorally in accordancewith their superior ideological, re-
ligious, ethical or cultural code.
The aim of criminal law is to protect society, in order to protect the
rights of all its citizens, by preventing transgressions from core social
rules and ethical values, decided in accordancewith the rules of democ-
racy. In order to make this possible it is important to warrant the en-
forcement of the law, the expectation that the law will be, in general,
respected, even by those who do not ideologically or morally share its
values (see Jakobs, 1976, 2004). Basing decisions about the enforcement
of the law upon internal, individual peculiarities or differences would
blow apart the very foundation of our current culpability-based criminal
law system fromwithin. And the alternative to this system is a criminal
law system grounded on criminal biosocial dangerousness. There were
past theoretical attempts (see in the last century the Defense Sociale
Nouvelle Defense Socialle in France or the Alternative Entwurf in
Germany, for example) and maybe this will be our future, but the dis-
cussion about this core issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, it is important to consider that the decision to commit a
crime is not just a moral dilemma, given the mandatory (coercive) na-
ture of criminal law. The law does not require or measure the
individual's avoidance to harm others and does not ask about personal
opinions of the defendant. It is an imperative that just asks to be andrequires to be obeyed, without exception. The legal imperative requires
respect, even if one disagrees or does not care. Therefore, the knowledge
of the unlawfulness of the act and capacity for self-control are enough.
Of course, it is possible that psychopaths do not find moral reasons to
not harm others or they are not afraid of being punished in the way
others are. Perhaps the definitional lack of emotional empathy makes
it more difficult for them to inhibit criminal behaviors, given that they
are driven only by instrumental reasons and self-interest. But in our
opinion, such difficulties do not warrant differential treatment by the
law or a reform of the notion of accountability.6. Conclusions
While significant advances have been made by scientists to under-
stand the etiology and nature of psychopaths, several questions still re-
main unanswered, related to its clear definition and identification.
Considering the current ‘status quo’ of the psychiatric, psychological, ge-
netic, neuroscientific and criminological literature, there is not a strong
and consistent scientific basis for reconsidering the current legal treat-
ment of psychopaths. Therefore, they should continue to be held fully
responsible in the eyes of the law. We do not close the door, of course,
to further advances in research, particularly regarding psychopaths in
the Factor 2 group, also called ‘secondary psychopaths’ or ‘sociopaths’,
whowould bemore likely tomeet criteria, at least, for amitigation, con-
sidering their supposed cognitive and volitional deficits. Paradoxically,
this recognitionwould also give scientific evidence to defend amore se-
vere treatment based on their bio-social (G × E) dangerousness. Before
any decision is made, it is necessary to clarify, first, the concept of psy-
chopathy, establish a coherent differentiation between types of psycho-
paths and identify the neurobiological correlates (and cognitive and/or
volitional implications) of psychopathy. Finally, we also conclude that
the emotional component of human rationality, whichmay be impaired
in psychopaths, should not be integrated in the normative notion of ac-
countability, because the decision to commit a crime is not just, or pri-
marily, a moral dilemma, given the coercive nature of criminal law.
The legal imperative only requires respect, being obeyed, with or with-
out internal moral commitment.Acknowledgement
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